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The rise of China has created an unprecedented demand for Latin American and Caribbean 
exports, which has helped boost the region’s growth for almost a decade. But ultimately, such 
export growth may not be sustainable. Perhaps even worse, Chinese manufactured goods are 
more competitive than those from Latin America in both home and world markets. These 
twin trends may jeopardize prospects for long-term growth in the region.
This short policy brief is based on the book, The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of 
Latin American Industrialization that I co-authored with Uruguayan political economist Roberto 
Porzecanski. This brief charts how China’s rise has stimulated Latin American exports 
significantly. However, we show that at the same time China has leapt over Latin America 
to become the most competitive exporter of manufactured goods in the world — leaving 92 
percent of 
Latin America’s 
manufacturing 
exports under 
threat from 
China in 2009. 
Manufacturing 
and modern 
services are the 
key to long-
term growth and prosperity. While China soars ahead by such measures, Latin America seems 
to be returning to a primary commodity-led export path. At a deeper level, China’s focus on 
building domestic productive capacities has been far more effective than Latin America’s 
“Washington Consensus” approach, which stresses the rapid liberalization of trade and 
investment, and the general reduction of the state in economic affairs.
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“ChinahasleaptoverLatinAmericato
becomethemostcompetitiveexporterof
manufacturedgoodsintheworld—leaving
92percentofLatinAmerica’smanufacturing
exportsunderthreatfromChinain2009.”
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Short-term Gains
China and the Latin American-Caribbean region (LAC) began to implement economic reforms 
within a few years of each other; China in 1978, much of Latin America in 1982. In 1980, 
the collective economic output of Latin America and the Caribbean was seven times that of 
China — 14 times greater on a per-capita basis. Nearly 30 years later, China had pulled ahead, 
with gross domestic product of $2.7 trillion in 2009 versus pan-regional GDP of $2.6 trillion 
in Latin America. Over the three decades, China registered a robust annual economic growth 
rate of eight percent. The average annual rate in Latin America has been a more modest 3.8 
percent. Between 1980 and 2009, GDP per capita increased by 6.6 percent annually in China, 
while in Latin America, per-capita GDP edged up by a mere 1.7 percent annually during years 
that were marked by crises and volatility.
Boom times in China have been good for Latin America, whose exports to the Asian 
powerhouse increased nine times between 2000 and 2009 in real terms, far outpacing the 
region’s overall export growth, which didn’t even double over the same period. In 2009, 
LAC exports to China reached $41.3 billion. The pre-financial crisis peak for LAC exports to 
China was $22.3 billion in 2006. However, this windfall was not widely shared: five countries 
and eight sectors generated just over 80 percent of all regional exports to China. In 2006, 
six countries and ten sectors dominated LAC trade to China. Regardless of the period, the 
sectors that have dominated LAC exports to China are metals, including iron and copper, 
accounting for nearly half and soybean and related oils, highlighting how the China factor was 
limited to certain sectors.
China is increasingly investing in many of these same Latin American sectors. Hard statistics are 
difficult to come by but Chinese firms have invested at least $25 billion in Latin America since 2005. 
Table 2 exhibits the larger Chinese foreign investments in Latin America between 2005 and 2010. 
As shown in the Table 2, the majority of this foreign direct investment (FDI) is “resource-
seeking” in the key sectors that serve as the source of Chinese demand: copper, oil, iron, and 
soybeans. However, Chinese FDI is also “market-seeking”, meaning it seeks to serve Latin 
American markets such as in the auto and tourism sectors. Finally, some Chinese investment 
Table 1: Five countries, eight Sectors, dominate Lac Trade to china (2009)
Sector Share of Total Lac exports to china country (Share of Total Lac exports to china in Sector)
Copper Alloys 17.9% Chile(90%)
Iron ore and concentrates 17.3% Brazil(89%)
Soybeans and other seeds 16.8% Brazil(83%), Argentina(16%)
Ores and concentrates of base metals 13.5% Chile(47%), Peru(39%)
Crude petroleum  4.5% Brazil(65%), Colombia(20%)
Soybean oil and other oils 4.5% Argentina(79%), Brazil(20%)
Pulp and waste paper 4.4% Brazil(55%), Chile(43%)
Feedstuff 2.4% Peru(63%), Chile(30%)
TOTAL  81.3%
Source: Author’s calculations from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.
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Table 2: chinese Foreign direct investment in Latin america
Year Month Investor Quantity (m)  sector subsector country
r e Sourc e - S e e K i n G
2005 May Minmetals $500 Metals   Cuba
2005 June Minmetals $550 Metals Copper Chile
2005 September CNPC and Sinopec $1,400 Energy Oil Ecuador
2006 September Sinopec $420 Energy Oil Columbia
2007 February Zijin Mining $186 Metals Copper Peru
2007 April Golden Dragon $100 Metals Copper tubes Mexico
2007 June Chalco $790 Metals Copper Peru
2007 December Minmetals and Jiangxi Copper $450 Metals Copper Peru
2008 May Chinalco $2,150 Metals Copper Peru
2008 May Jinchuan Group and $214 Metals Copper Tubes Mexico 
  China-Africa Development Fund
2009 February Shougang Group  $1,000 Metals Iron Peru
2009 December Shunde Rixin $1,900 Metals Iron Chile
2010 March State Grid $1,050 Metals  Copper Chile
2010 March East China Minerals (Jiangsu) $1,200 Metals  Iron Brazil
2010 March CNOOC $3,100 Energy   Argentina
2010 April CNPC $900 Energy Oil Venezuela
2010 May China Sci-Tech $255 Metals Copper Peru
2010 May State Grid $1,720 Power   Brazil
2010 May Sinochem $3,070 Energy Oil Brazil
2010 September Chongching Co $300 Real estate Soy land Brazil
 M a r K e T- S e e K i n G
2009 May Lenovo $40  Manufacturing Electronics Mexico
2009 September State Construction Engineering $100 Real estate Tourism Bahamas
2009 November Wuhan Iron and Steel $400 Metals Iron Brazil
2010 August Chery Auto $700 Transport Autos Brazil
2010 September Sany Heavy Industry $100 Manufacturing Metalworking Brazil
e F F i c i e n c y - S e e K i n G
2007 June Chery Auto $100 Transport Autos Uruguay
2008 April Sinotex $92  Manufacturing Textiles Mexico
2009 December Hebei Zhongxin $400 Transport Autos Mexico
2010 April Foton Mexico $250 Manufacturing Autos Mexico
Total    $23,437
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2010; Scissors, 2010; SinoLatin, 2010; Ellis, 2009; author interviews and newspaper research.
in Latin America is “efficiency-seeking” whereby it has located in Uruguay or Mexico to serve 
as an export platform to Brazil and the U.S. respectively.
Beyond creating a new, hungry market for Latin American trade and Chinese investment, 
China’s voracious appetite resulted in more demand and higher prices for these Latin 
American raw materials and agricultural outputs in markets around the world. From 2000 
to 2007, the year before the financial crisis hit, 
Chinese demand accounted for 20 percent of 
world export growth in metals, 11 percent for 
copper, 55 percent for iron, and 58 percent for 
soy. Since the crisis, while global demand for 
these same commodities decreased, Chinese 
demand for them doubled.  
 
Longer-run implications could  
Be costly 
Over the longer-run future it is hard to predict 
whether China will be a sustained source of 
demand for Latin American commodities. Even 
if China does maintain its appetite for Latin 
American commodities, the consequences may 
not all be beneficial. China could accentuate 
Latin America’s (over) reliance on commodities 
exports and jeopardize the region’s capabilities for 
diversifying its export basket toward manufacturing 
and modern services. Long-lasting social and 
environmental effects could be acute as well. 
As we show in the book, for example, between 
1995 and 2009, Brazilian soy production 
quadrupled, in part because approximately half 
of all Brazilian soy exports went to China. At 
the same time, employment in the soy sector 
shrank as cultivation became highly mechanized. 
Moreover, increased demand for soy has been 
linked to the deforestation of more than 528,000 
square kilometers in the Brazilian Amazon. Such 
deforestation has threatened the livelihoods of 
many indigenous Brazilians and contributed to 
accentuating global climate change.
Economists also express concern that China’s tug 
on the LAC export basket will inflict the region 
with “Dutch disease”, where primary commodity-
dependent countries do not develop strongly 
because they are victims of a “resource curse.” 
Nations overly dependent on commodities have 
been shown to deindustrialize because discoveries 
of such resources and their subsequent export raise the value of a nation’s currency and make 
manufactured and agricultural goods as well as services less competitive. This  eventually 
results in increasing imports and decreasing exports, creating balance-of-payments problems, 
and leading to poor economic performance.  
In the past few years we have witnessed significant currency appreciation across Latin 
America, though it is not clear that such appreciation has been due to commodities prices or 
other factors. In terms of competitiveness however, it is clear that China is outcompeting Latin 
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Table 3: china Becomes Most competitive Manufacturing exporter
Source: Author’s calculations from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.
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America in world manufactures and services exports. Table 3 shows that China has become 
the most competitive manufacturing exporter in the world, measured by the China share of 
manufacturing in total world manufacturing exports.  
Table 3 shows that in 1980 China was not even on the radar screen in terms of global competitiveness 
but by 2009 China’s manufacturing sector became the most competitive in the world. Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico are the only Latin American nations with significant world export share and all 
three have struggled to maintain competitiveness during the period exhibited in Table 3.
Table 3: china Becomes Most competitive Manufacturing exporter
Source: Author’s calculations from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.
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In our book we calculated that nearly all 
of the exports from Latin America and 
Caribbean are under “threat” from China. 
Drawing on previous work from the Asian 
Development Bank, we characterize a “direct 
threat,” as those products in global or 
home markets where China’s market share 
is increasing while the market share of Latin 
America and the Caribbean is decreasing. A 
“partial threat,” occurs when Latin American 
market share is increasing at a slower rate 
than China. We found that 94 percent of 
manufacturing exports from Latin America 
and the Caribbean are facing a partial or 
direct threat from China. These products 
represented 40 percent of all regional 
exports in 2006, and were collectively worth 
more than $260 billion. There was a slight 
improvement in 2009, with 92 percent of 
Latin American manufacturing exports 
falling under threat from China, representing 
39 percent of the region’s total exports.
Mexico is most vulnerable, with 97 percent of 
its manufacturing exports — which represent 
71 percent of the national export base — 
under threat from China in 2009. Table 4 
exhibits our threat analysis for Latin America.
Central America, one of the poorest sub-
regions in Latin America, is of particular 
concern. In the 1980s, most of the countries 
in that region established processing zones that assemble apparel for export into the United 
States. By 2001, such zones generated 87 percent of all Salvadoran exports to the United 
States, 78 percent of those from Honduras and 63 percent for both Guatemala and Nicaragua.
As recently as 2001, China and Central America were on par, with each selling about $6.5 
billion worth of apparel to the United States and each holding a 12 percent share of the 
American apparel market. In 2004, Central American clothing exports to United States had 
risen to $7.5 billion, while those from China, whose entry in to the World Trade Organization 
was under way, had jumped to $10.7 billion.
In 2005, the capstone of this relationship, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
took effect. By lowering tariffs and locking in access to the U.S. economy, CAFTA was supposed 
to solidify Central America as a clothing hub. Instead, clothing exports from Central America 
plunged 25 percent from pre-CAFTA days to $5.6 billion in 2009. Their share of American 
apparel imports has slipped to 8.7 percent while China enjoys a commanding 38 percent share.
Latin America is being outcompeted by China on its home turf as well. Other Latin American 
markets are very important to nations in the region, representing 23 percent of all Latin 
American manufacturing exports and 19 percent of total Latin American exports in 2009.  
For some nations, such as Argentina, manufacturing exports to other Latin American nations 
www.bu.edu/pardee
Table 4: Percentage of Lac export Markets  
under “Threat” from china
 direct  Partial Total
argentina
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 20% 53% 73%
As % of All Exports in 2009 6% 15% 21%
Brazil
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 30% 54% 84%
As % of All Exports in 2009 10% 18% 28%
chile
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 21% 70% 91%
As % of All Exports in 2009 1% 4% 5%
colombia
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 27% 62% 89%
As % of All Exports in 2009 6% 14% 20%
costa rica
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 48% 51% 99%
As % of All Exports in 2009 21% 22% 43%
Mexico   
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 52% 45% 97%
As % of All Exports in 2009 38% 33% 71%
Lac   
As % of Manufacturing Exports in 2009 52% 40% 92%
As % of All Exports in 2009 22% 17% 39%
Source: Author’s calculations from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics.
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represented 73 percent of all manufacturing exports in 2009, or 42 percent of total exports. 
For Chile, Latin American represents 65 percent of all manufacturing exports and 16 percent 
of total exports. For Columbia, 70 and 31 percent. For Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, 50, 
93, and 80 percent of all manufacturing exports to Latin America were under direct or partial 
threat from China in 2009.
 
china as Latin american opportunity
China is not to blame. These trends are largely the result of policies made by Latin American 
countries. Many had adopted “shock therapy” or the “Washington Consensus.” Governments 
rapidly liberalized trade and investment regimes and reduced the role of the state in economic 
affairs, often through privatizations that, in a number of cases, went painfully awry. China has 
taken a more gradual approach to integrating with world markets.  
Rather than blaming China, Latin America can build on some of its own recent success, and 
learn from China in order to maximize the gains from its new economic relationship with China.  
The additional revenue generated by exports to China and elsewhere can provide new sources 
of funds for stabilization and growth programs. In the book we outline how Chile and a 
handful of other Latin American nations have created stabilization funds that save some of 
the proceeds from commodities exports for periods when prices are low or when the nation 
needs macroeconomic stimulus. Chile’s such fund, which comes from copper exports, enabled 
that nation to put together a stimulus package in response to the financial crisis.  
There is no reason why such funds need only to be earmarked toward macroeconomic 
stabilization. Revenue from commodities exports could also be used to invest in 
environmental programs to mitigate the negative effects of commodity-driven growth, and, 
perhaps most importantly, in programs to boost industrial competitiveness.
It is in terms of industrial competitiveness where Latin America can learn from China. China’s 
path to integration with world markets has been a gradual and strategic one whereas most 
Latin American nations have rapidly relinquished the role of the state in economic affairs.  
Whereas Latin America roughly started its reform period following the oil crisis in 1982, 
Chinese economic reforms started in 1978, two years after the death of Mao Zedong. In that 
year, China embarked on a program of economic reform aiming at strategic integration into 
the world economy by following a “dual track” policy. The policy consisted of liberalizing FDI 
and inflow of imported inputs to selected industries while buttressing those sectors to the point 
of maturity and nurturing other sectors until they were ready to face competition with imports. 
According to the literature, China’s industrial strategy has been three-pronged. First, government 
policy aimed at creating  domestic productive capacity, in the form of targeting specific 
industries through state ownership (SOEs) or government support, paying increasing attention 
to science and technology policy, and linking the SOEs with the private sector and research 
institutes. Second, and very importantly, Chinese support for domestic industry has always had 
an eye on markets outside of China. China has also gradually and strategically integrated into 
world markets in order to gain access to technology and finance.
Third, in undertaking economic reform, China’s new leaders followed an experimental 
approach. In the case of LAC, free trade and a market-based economy could be seen as an end 
in itself; it was taken for granted that such a transition alone would enhance learning through 
trade and lead to the deepening of industrialization and promotion of growth. By contrast, 
Chinese policy was based on using the market and trade as a means to development. Hence, 
www.bu.edu/pardee
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in the eyes of Chinese policy makers, market and government policies were to supplement each 
other while the weight of each would change as the economy develops.
Such an approach stands in stark contrast to Latin America. The region experimented with 
industrial policy during its Import Substituting Industrialization period (roughly 1940 to 1980). 
The approach was a modest success at best. The policy did help industrialize nations like Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina and others in the region. Yet, with a few exceptions many of the firms within 
those industries were extremely inefficient by global standards because there was too much a 
focus on domestic markets. What is more, Latin American industrial policy was financed largely 
by debt, in contrast to export revenue and savings in the Chinese case. One exception is Brazil, 
where the country’s development bank is aggressively promoting industrial competitiveness.
Invigorating and expanding stabilization funds with export revenue from China and elsewhere 
coupled with an innovative approach to industrialization could form part of a strategy where 
China becomes an opportunity for the future of Latin American development. A business-as-usual 
approach could be dangerous. Over-reliance on primary commodities could cause macroeconomic, 
employment, and environmental problems in the longer-run. What’s more, China is already swiftly 
out-competing Latin America in world manufacturing markets. As China has shown, nations can 
conduct economic reforms to great benefit. Latin America could follow suit. •
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